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 17.1  The Current World Risk Society 
 At the beginning of this book we set out the “why” and “what” questions associated 
with global risks and regulation. The book addresses these two ambitious questions 
in a number of different ways. 
 17.1.1  The “Why” of Business Risk Regulation 
 The various contributions discussed the rationales justifying regulatory action and 
illustrated how different these may be in today’s economically challenged and geo-
politically changing world. A mix of economic, legal, sociological, political and 
public administration perspectives shapes the reasons triggering regulator action 
about food, drugs, climate change and  fi nancial markets. 
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 Even within the framework of these disciplines, no absolute statements can be 
made with regard to macro relations between risks, costs, and regulation. This is 
because it all depends on the way examples are derived from distinct sectors of the 
economy at discrete time periods. On the one hand, according to public economic 
theory, more regulation can cause higher costs. For instance, the Laffer curve illus-
trates how regulation can be welfare enhancing up to a certain point but also—once it 
reveals excessive costs—how it may become harmful to society (Chaps.  6 ,  8 and  15 ). 
 Similarly, transaction costs (in terms of monitoring costs of the regulator, bonding 
costs by the regulated private economic entities and the costs of residual loss for non-
compliance) can be seen as objective burdens of regulation, which call to be com-
pared to the economic bene fi ts of regulation (Chap.  7 ). On the other hand, however, 
evidence from recent climate, food and (more recent)  fi nancial crises shows that less 
regulation has not been automatically bene fi cial for economic development. This 
explains the ongoing regulatory activism on both sides of the Atlantic on the regula-
tion of  fi nancial services. However, in Chap.  6 it is argued that the new Basel III 
supervisory measures for the  fi nancial sector may be very costly, even taking into 
account the societal damage the insuf fi cient regulation leading to the credit crisis has 
brought about. They may bring regulation beyond the top of the regulatory Laffer 
curve. On the other hand, according to Chap.  8 , regulation so far has not hindered 
economic growth so that the top of the Laffer curve has not yet been reached. 
 Any reform of the regulatory risk framework presents policymakers with chal-
lenging legal issues. For example, legal barriers to the competitiveness of the 
European food industry need to be fully understood before suggesting ways 
to improve the legal system (Chap.  5 ). Common rules governing international trans-
actions are perceived as the indispensable starting point of international trade 
(Chap.  12 ). At the same time, the legal framework carries the potential to facilitate 
the way risks are assessed and managed. Under this perspective the idea of “cross-
border consistency” in the assessment phase of legislative proposals represents an 
exciting prospective development in EU risk frameworks (Chap.  11 ). 
 In turn, the incorporation of sociological perspectives requires integrated 
approaches to risk assessment, management and communication, such as those pro-
posed by the International Risk Governance Council (Chap.  2 ). Yet current political 
constructions often fail to re fl ect the risk preferences of the wider public. This has 
been demonstrated in the  fi nancial crisis, which emphasised how  fi nancial regula-
tion is not aligned with social preferences (Chap.  6 ). What is more, the political 
account of the public indignation over the responsibilities of  fi nancial institutions in 
relation to the global  fi nancial crisis (e.g. higher consumer protection and lower tax 
payer exposure) does not always re fl ect the needs of the global market. 
 In this space, the public administrative perspective offers solutions that are aimed 
at keeping public administration, regulatory intervention and the interaction between 
economic actors and regulators up to speed with an increasingly dynamic set of 
risks. Instruments which focus on reducing the administrative costs of regulation 
are destined to play a vital role in this domain. They are likely to succeed only when 
applied systematically and are fully understood by those vulnerable economic and 
non-economic actors who are affected the most by excessive regulation (Chap.  9 ). 
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The Standard Cost Model is one example of such instruments. Yet future applications 
of this tool face today new challenges with regard to compliance and bene fi t accounting 
(Chap.  14 ). 
 17.1.2  The “What” of Business Risk Regulation 
 Several policy areas were covered in this volume in order to address the question of 
what the object of regulation is. These include  fi nancial,  fi scal, competition, social, 
trade and environmental policies. The book responds to current policymakers’ inter-
ests in the role of business regulation in today’s world risk society. In particular, by 
looking at the costs of State intervention in the  fi nancial sector, it discusses the pos-
sible responses to the current economic crisis and addresses the broader conceptual 
discussion about more or less regulation in the  fi nancial sector (Chap.  6 ). The  fi scal 
burdens of regulation are typically examined through Laffer curves (Chap.  15 ). The 
most recent developments of the proposed Tobin Tax for  fi nancial transactions and 
with the new Basel III rules for macroprudential supervision provide further exam-
ples of mechanisms aimed at the repair of the failure of  fi nancial markets. 
Competition issues are addressed in terms of cross-border consistency of regulation 
(Chap.  11 ) and competitiveness of the European food industry (Chap.  5 ). Competition 
for scarce natural resources between countries will arguably involve higher levels of 
risk to the market than commercial risks (Chap.  12 ). 
 In addressing the question of what is regulated in a world risk society, some 
contributions touched upon concepts, conditions and phenomena that inevitably 
determine the ontology of global risk regulation. The concept of trust shapes not 
only the relationship between regulators and regulated (e.g. pharmaceutical indus-
try), but also the very object (i.e. the “what” question) of policies (Chap.  10 ). 
Similarly, though for different reasons, the scienti fi cally institutionalized condition 
of climate change is a common driver in determining world governments’ environ-
mental policies for the forthcoming decades (Chap.  4 ). The upsurge of a risk society 
can be seen as the phenomenon which fosters European regulation in areas such as 
food safety, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, crop protection and 
GMOs and in the near future nanotechnologies, food from cloned animals and 
human enhancement applications (Chap.  3 ). 
 The perspective of public sector economics teaches that answers to the “why” and 
“what” questions are related to the question why the government or some other 
authorities are bound to intervene in the market process anyhow. The answer is that 
the visible hand of state intervention is needed whenever the invisible hand of the 
market mechanism does not lead to as much welfare as possible. This is the case 
when the outcome of the economic process evokes social preferences for redistribu-
tion, when there is a need for provision of public goods, and, from the viewpoint of 
regulation most importantly, when there is market failure (Chap.  7 ). Examples of 
market failure are negative externalities, such as those emerging from systemic cri-
sis of the  fi nancial markets (Chap.  6 ), from environmental damage (Chap.  4 ), from 
288 A. Alemanno et al.
risks associated with the use of drugs from the pharmaceutical industry (Chap.  10 ), 
from risks from long and complex food supply chains (Chap.  5 ) as well as those 
stemming from protectionist trade policies (Chap.  11 ). 
 Once a more or less satisfactory answer is given to the “why” and “what” ques-
tions, next comes the question on how the regulation can be designed at lowest 
possible costs and with highest societal bene fi ts. Indeed, according to economic 
theory, the best design of the regulation is the one that brings about the highest wel-
fare gains as compared to a situation without regulation. Yet in practice the net 
bene fi ts from regulation, as a result of gross bene fi ts minus costs, are dif fi cult to 
establish, especially when regulation concerns externalities with a high risk compo-
nent. Costs can be quanti fi ed using methods like the SCM (Chap.  14 ) or implemen-
tation costs based on agency theory (Chap.  7 ), but the uncertainty margins of the 
results are large. That is even more true for the calculation of the bene fi ts of regula-
tion. These bene fi ts are equal to the opportunity costs of not regulating, but obvi-
ously in case of risks these costs are hard to calculate as they often relate to the costs 
of disasters with low probabilities but high and hopefully unknown costs when the 
risks materialize. A common and, maybe, the best available solution for the how 
question is to institutionalize regulation. The theory of new institutional economics 
provides ample evidence that institutions may reduce transaction costs, and more 
speci fi cally in the case of regulation, the implementation costs of regulation (see 
e.g. Ménard and Shirley  2005 ) . This edited volume provides ample examples of 
such institutionalizing of regulation in formal or informal organizations (Chaps. 
 3 – 6 ,  9 – 12 and  16 ). A major advantage of institutionalization of risks assessment and 
risk regulation is that it may enhance trust, so as to reduce the implementation costs 
of regulation (Chaps.  7 and  10 ). 
 17.2  The Features of Global Risk Regulation 
 At the end of this journey through the world risk society three dominant features 
seem to dominate and, consequently, govern the relationship between risk and regu-
lation in the global economy. 
 First, the identi fi cation of those who make critical decisions on signi fi cant global 
risk issues appears clear-cut in some cases (e.g.  fi nancial sector, pharmaceutical 
industry), but rather blurry in other cases (e.g. food industry, climate change, and 
infectious diseases). Indeed, risk decision makers are not always as few as one might 
think (Jasanoff  2005 ) . This makes the risk analyst’s work, or that of any other 
observer, increasingly more complicated. The cross-border nature increasingly 
characterizes global risks. Moreover, the high level of interconnectivity existing 
between them questions the very taxonomy of risk decision makers, i.e. who they 
are and how they can be classi fi ed. This outcome calls for the adoption of multiple 
disciplinary lenses and approaches that go beyond traditional divisions between 
developing and developed countries, private and public sector, service and manufac-
turing industries. It is against this backdrop that the multi-voice narrative of 
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this edited volume has facilitated the reconstruction of some of the interactions 
between risk assessors (e.g. the climate scientists) and risk managers (e.g. the 
 decision makers who sat at the Copenhagen Conference). However, the different 
institutional settings and risk cultures suggest that the link between risk assessors 
and risk managers cannot always be unambiguously disentangled. In particular 
in the absence of sentiment of belonging to a common epistemic framework, 
their uneasy relationship often fails to effectively integrate scienti fi c expertise into 
regulatory action. 
 Second, if the identi fi cation of risk decision makers is characterized by uncer-
tainty, the identi fi cation of the actors affected by global risks is at times equally 
problematic. For instance, in order to prevent systemic failures it might be consid-
ered necessary to intervene in  fi nancial markets by regulating  fi nancial institutions 
with instruments that in turn affect consumer protection and investors’ exposure to 
risk. Common global objectives for mitigating climate change imply that the non-
implementation of, for instance, energy ef fi ciency policies in developed countries 
might have a negative impact on the cost-effectiveness of renewable sources of 
energy for global investors in developing countries. However, all contributions in 
this book imply that the  fi nal recipient of societal risks is ultimately a broadly 
de fi ned public—exposure to societal risk reduces social welfare, even more so when 
the public is risk averse. The technical and scienti fi c features of global risks mean 
that in several instances the public is detached from risk decisions. Although risk 
regulation emerges as one way to ensure specialized decisions on risk, several 
examples discussed in this book highlight that often third actors act on behalf of the 
public. Examples from the pharmaceutical and food industry show that the media 
typically cover multiple roles while informing the public; they shape its risk percep-
tion and summarize available research knowledge on global risks which are both 
inherent to and distant from common people’s everyday life. This in turn affects the 
role of trust in risk–bene fi t analysis and risk decision-making. 
 Third, the fact that risk recipients are moving targets means that the assessment 
of global risks cannot rely on deterministic baselines. Two examples can be drawn 
from  fi nancial and climate risks. 
 The non-deterministic basis for assessment is the problem faced in the global 
 fi nancial market where the oversimpli fi cation of existing risk assessment practices 
can be singled out as the most signi fi cant reason for the non-identi fi cation of the key 
factors that could have prevented the most recent  fi nancial crisis. The non-linear 
relationship between risk and hazard implies that simplistic and linear models nega-
tively impact on any accurate depiction of the risks in  fi nancial markets. 
Unsuspectingly, the uncertainty on non-linear errors produced by each  fi nancial 
transaction leads to higher uncertainty about aggregate levels of transactions. In 
other words, a mistake is just a mistake. A mistake multiplied by thousands is a 
disaster. In economic terminology this phenomenon is labelled the “fallacy of com-
position” where the effect at the macro-level is more than the sum of the effects at 
the micro-level. Neglecting the fallacy of composition may have been one of the 
major failures incurred by the  fi nancial regulators, thus causing the credit and debts 
crises of 2007–2012 (and beyond?) (Den Butter  2011 ) . 
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 In climate change risks, the unit of analysis moves from single  fi nancial transactions 
to the weight of carbon emissions, but the mechanism remains similar. Climate science 
agrees that co-ordinated action is necessary when tackling climate change. Carbon 
emission reduction targets can be met through either carbon taxes or emission trad-
ing schemes, such as the ETS in Europe. The latter has been implemented for over 
10 years across several European industries and now extended to the airline sector 
(Alemanno  2011 ) . However, discrepancies between assessments of the allocation of 
allowances and actual performances (in terms of actual carbon emissions) have 
increased investment risks in allowances and caused signi fi cant reductions in car-
bon prices. 
 17.3  Complexity and Contagion 
 It has already been mentioned that the negligence of the  fi nancial regulators has 
been a major cause of the recent  fi nancial and debt crises. Banking regulation was 
mainly concerned with individual banks, the so-called micro-prudential regulation, 
and the risks for a systemic crisis were disregarded. Now that the crisis has caused 
great societal damage, more understanding has been attained for the mechanisms at 
work. It is realized that much more attention should have been paid to macro-pru-
dential regulation which considers the  fi nancial system as a whole. Here  fi nancial 
innovations, such as securitization, introduced complexities in the system which 
enhanced the risk of contagion. The supervisors of the  fi nancial system were 
unaware, or too little aware, of the externalities that these complexities bring about. 
The externalities were not adequately internalized, so that contagion was not 
avoided. Moreover globalization caused the  fi nancial industry to be so much con-
nected and entangled on a worldwide scale that banks and countries were soon “too 
big to fail” or to formulate it better, “too connected to fail”. The bailouts of govern-
ments further strengthened this connectivity and the moral hazard associated with it. 
As the chapters of this book, apart from Chap.  6 , do not explicitly consider the regu-
latory shortcomings that the  fi nancial crisis revealed, some attention is given here to 
recent literature which zooms in on the economic mechanisms at work. The litera-
ture also suggests how targeted regulation may prevent future risks of contagion. 
 Gallegati et al.  ( 2008 ) provide an interesting model-based analysis of the implo-
sion of the  fi nancial system. These authors, including Nobel laureate Stiglitz, show 
that securitization has led during the good times of rising housing prices to a strong 
interdependence of  fi nancial institutions. In the downturn of the economic tide, 
when housing prices began to fall, this interdependence proved through contagion 
to result in a negative externality, not foreseen by the supervisors. The externality is 
that the initial shock of falling house prices, which reduced the value of the pack-
ages of mortgages held by banks, evoked a global distrust between the banks on the 
value of their mutual debts. The analysis thus shows why the strong interdepen-
dence of  fi nancial institutions caused an ampli fi cation of the initial shock rather 
than absorption of the shock due to the risk diversi fi cation. The analysis also 
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 provides a lesson on how a different and better supervision may in the future prevent 
such crises. The remedy is to stop the further entanglement of the  fi nancial markets 
and avoid contagion but permit risk diversi fi cation. Decoupling of different parts of 
the banking system and a greater diversity in the business form part of the solution. 
In other words, when the dominoes of the  fi nancial markets are set further apart, the 
chance that all of them fall down at the same shock becomes smaller. 
 Caballero and Simsek  ( 2009 ) also focus on the mechanisms which were the driv-
ing forces in the credit crisis. They distinguish three externalities. Besides the “net-
work externality” and the “ fi re sales” externality, which were already described by 
others, these authors add a “complexity externality”. This externality takes account 
of the fact that the  fi nancial system has become so complex, for example because of 
cascades of sales of various types of securitized assets, so that the judgment of the 
risks gets blurred. If the banks are risk-averse the increased uncertainty about 
the risks in the network leads to a reduction of welfare of the banks. The result is a 
negative spiral which is sizeable because a problem in the  fi nancial world does not 
only have an effect on the institutions which therefore also get into trouble (the 
network externality), but also on all other institutions that lose sight of the events. 
This provides a good description of how a lack of trust resulted in a rapid stop of 
trade in liquid assets between banks. The notion of a complexity externality informs 
the discussion on what and how to regulate in the modern complex risk society. 
 Gai et al.  ( 2011 ) show how systemic liquidity crises of the kind associated with 
the interbank market collapse of 2007–2008 can arise in a framework with conta-
gion spreading widely through the web of interlinkages. They illustrate how greater 
complexity and concentration in the  fi nancial network may amplify this fragility. 
The analysis suggests how a range of policy measures, including tougher liquidity 
regulation, macro-prudential policy, and surcharges for systemically important 
 fi nancial institutions, could make the  fi nancial system more resilient. 
 These suggestions for regulatory measures to reduce the risk of contagion, 
relate to the broader context of enhanced complexity in the risk society. An exam-
ple of a small future shock that may propagate through contagion to cause large 
societal damage is that of a solar storm. It may be that within a couple of years a 
solar storm hits the earth with the same intensity of that of 1859. In its new solar 
cycle prediction of 29 May 2009, NASA now forecasts the peak of the sunspot 
activity of “solar cycle 24” for May 2013. Although the activity of solar cycle 24 
is predicted to be rather mild as compared to other periods of high solar activity, it 
may not prevent the new solar storm to be the beginning of a new crisis. The top 
of the solar cycle in 1859 was also below average. Its intensity was the result of a 
coincidence of circumstances where the magnetic  fi eld of the electri fi ed gas that 
took off from the sun interfered with the magnetic  fi eld of the earth and hence 
disturbed its protection. Such a geomagnetic storm will cause much damage to the 
electricity distribution as it will expose many transformers in the system to perma-
nent damage. It will also disturb all kinds of wireless communication. In 1859, the 
societal impact of the storm was not yet large because the uses of electricity and 
radio communication were in its infancies. Nowadays it is very different: transmis-
sion and distribution networks for electricity are so interconnected that the storm 
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may cause a large scale blackout of supply. Moreover, electric power is modern 
societies’ cornerstone technology, the technology on which virtually all other 
infrastructures and services depend. So, apart from the electricity supply, a severe 
solar storm will cause an enormous collateral damage. In 2008 a Committee on the 
Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather Events made, under the 
auspices of the National Research Council in the US, a scenario for a “severe geo-
magnetic storm”. The scenario estimates the economic and societal costs to be $1 
to $2 trillion during the  fi rst year alone, with recovery times of 4–10 years. So the 
overall economic and societal costs of the storm may even exceed that of the recent 
 fi nancial crisis. 
 This example of the solar storm as initial shock to the economic system should 
by no means be considered as a prediction of what is actually going to happen. It is 
only intended to show how regulation in the global economy should focus on the 
risks of contagion that the complexities of the risk society have brought about. The 
fundamental nature of crisis prevention is that initial shocks are unpredictable and 
that therefore regulation should focus on the propagation mechanisms. 
 The complexity of the risk society, which goes hand in hand with enhanced dan-
ger for contagion and the consequently enhanced ampli fi cation of adverse shocks, 
has consequences on several areas of risk regulation. Complexity and contagion are 
crucial to the risks of modern society where supply chains become more and more 
long and complicated, and where networks gain more and more importance. This 
has important consequences for regulation, where there is an increased need for 
coordination on a global scale. An additional problem is that risks from various 
sources become correlated so that forthcoming regulation has to take into account 
multiple risks. On the other hand, empirical research on measuring complexity 
shows that these measures of complexity are correlated with a country’s level of 
income, so that more complexity is associated with economic welfare (Hidalgo and 
Hausmann  2009 ) . This implies a huge trade-off between complexity and the need 
for more costly regulation in a risk society. 
 17.4  Learning from Multiple World Risk Stories 
 The contributions in this book provided a multitude of stories around global risks. 
They offered a multi-facet and multi-colour picture of several heterogeneous aspects 
of the world society. Any attempt to portray global risks is faced with institutional, 
sectoral and cultural challenges. When addressing the complexities associated with 
global risks, this book followed the numerous paths traced by different disciplines. 
The reason why the literature in this area is so vast is partly because the theoretical 
and conceptual nuances are almost as abundant as the experiences stemming out of 
practice. In this sense the practitioners’ task of foreseeing the effects of emerging 
risks in the market, the environment and society equals the researchers’ effort to 
analyse such multiple layers through disciplinary lenses. 
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 Despite the wealth of institutions, sectors and risk cultures, all contributions 
share in common the attempt to provide critical narratives of topics which are  current 
to the production of this book and pertinent to the literature on the world risk society. 
For this reason, issues related to the  fi nancial crisis and climate change play a central 
role in this work. Such contributions can provide additional information on current 
discussions on, for example, the proposed Tobin Tax for “rich”  fi nancial transactions 
in Europe and the policy discussion on levels of incentives for renewable sources of 
energy. Although some contributions involve theoretical discussions, the nature of 
most chapters is predominantly empirical. Coming back to the research questions set 
out in the introduction, how can these experiences contribute to a univocal general 
account for the risk literature? The book makes tangible contributions to this vast 
risk literature with regard to (1) the generalizability of different policies thanks to 
regulatory instruments (standard cost model, regulatory impact analysis and cost–
bene fi t analysis); (2) the likelihood of cost-effective regulatory intervention preserv-
ing public and private interests; and (3) the consequences of applying synthetic 
approaches to policymaking for the existing proceedings of law producing. 
 Whilst it is acknowledged here that each project and each regulation entails a 
distinct story (Heritier  2001 ; Majone  2003 ) , instruments like the Standard Cost 
Model, regulatory impact analysis and cost–bene fi t analysis make single policy sto-
ries comparable and bring them under the same heading. 
 The integration of bene fi t accounting in new versions of the standard cost model 
might represent one of the most signi fi cant developments in the measurement of 
regulatory costs for businesses and non-economic actors from a public administra-
tion perspective. It might cover the gap between cost accounting and welfare gains. 
In Chap.  14 the book pays attention to the Standard Cost Model as a practical policy 
tool to overcome some of the obstacles of better business regulation. It is believed 
that particularly in countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, where major 
deletion of existing regulation is expected to take place over the forthcoming years, 
easy understandable and manageable instruments which enable measurements of 
the administrative costs of regulation in order to facilitate the process of making 
better business regulation will be a very frequently applied remedy. 
 In the same countries, but also for other troubled economies in the aftermath of 
the most recent economic crisis, regulatory reform is likely to  fi nd its technical/
analytical counterpart in regulatory impact assessment, to date the main aid to regu-
latory policy proposals. The contributions in this book are not aimed at simply 
 demonstrating that this instrument is diversely applied by different governments 
(a notion already exempli fi ed by other works). They capture something different 
and yet consistent with the empirical literature on regulatory impact assessment, i.e. 
the awareness that this instrument has not yet achieved its climax. A pessimistic 
interpretation of this is that regulatory impact assessments do not match the expec-
tations set out either in theoretical work (Torriti  2011 ) or institutional guidelines 
(European Commission  2009 ) . These authors argue that a stronger focus on the risk 
economics aspects of regulatory impact assessment would imply more attention to 
issues such as the quality of data, methods to estimate the price of carbon and the 
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integration of macroeconomic modelling techniques. These also believe that there 
is no “one size  fi ts all solution” regarding the policy instruments—SCM, RIA or 
C/B-analysis—to be chosen. This depends on the  questions to be answered as well 
as the context within which those questions are raised. 
 With regard to cost–bene fi t analysis, one of the most controversial issues of its 
application in policy areas like drugs, food and the environment is its rather in fl exible 
nature in relation to risk. The way reductions in risks are accounted as bene fi ts is 
still subject to scienti fi c and political controversy. This is the case, for instance, in 
the relationship between industry and regulator in the pharmaceutical sector, where 
the approval of a drug is often conditional to a shared understanding of the ratio 
between bene fi ts and risks. Ultimately, uncertainty around the measurement and 
application of the value of statistical life, i.e. the analytical instruments responsible 
for monetizing reductions in risks to human life, might be pointed out as one expla-
nation for the obstacles encountered by practitioners in implementing risk-based 
cost–bene fi t analysis. 
 With regard to the second point, the line for allowing for regulatory intervention 
while preserving public and private interests in cost-effective ways is extremely thin. 
Instances where distortions from regulation can be minimized and the bene fi ts from 
regulations could be maximized can be counted on one hand and are faced with sev-
eral constraints and asymmetries of information. Several contributions cover different 
aspects of cost–bene fi t measurements in public administration as well as private 
industry. In an attempt to classify these different experiences in two borderline cases, 
the book describes examples where the regulatory framework allows businesses to 
compete on a cost basis and examples where this is not the case. The former border-
line case implies that the related public goals are less likely to be endangered, transac-
tion costs are minimized, trust is high and so are compliance levels. The latter 
borderline case is associated with the absence of risk-based regulation due to the com-
plexities of the risk society. In these cases the relationship between businesses and 
policymakers is permeated by low trust and high transaction costs. The contributions 
in this book illustrate a wealth of examples from different geographies and sectors 
which can often be positioned somewhere in between the two borderline cases. 
 One of the most interesting  fi ndings is that the gap between conceptual theory 
and empirical studies is signi fi cantly large. Some of the chapters in this book show 
how most of the theoretical expectations have been partly invalidated by interna-
tional experiences. Perhaps this imbalance is also a consequence of the different 
assumptions, methods and modelling techniques stemming out of very dissimilar 
disciplines. For instance, economists model economic regulatory tools in terms of 
price shocks and monetization of non-market values while political scientists look 
at them in terms of their functions and processes. 
 Finally, a further interesting learning point is the necessity of promoting new 
approaches to legal theory and policymaking in order to tackle the major externali-
ties of the risk society. 
 Society has never been healthier, wealthier and smarter, yet we are increasingly 
risk averse. The most recent  fi ndings of behavioural research suggest a credible answer 
to this apparent paradox: humans deviate in predictable ways from neoclassical 
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assumptions of rationality (Tversky and Kahneman  1974 ) . After having regulated risk 
in terms of probabilities and costs, policymakers are becoming more aware of the 
need to incorporate these insights into regulatory analysis to not only reduce the eco-
nomic cost but also to increase the effectiveness of risk regulation, such as climate 
change or chemical legislation (Kahneman  2011 ) . At a time in which regulation enters 
the behavioural era, the challenge is to integrate into the regulatory process also the 
extra-rational factor (Vandenbergh et al.  2011 ) . It is indeed becoming increasingly 
clear that regulation cannot work effectively if it does not consider how targeted popu-
lations respond. 
 Any regulatory model failing to do that is likely to be  fl awed and not deliver its 
expected results. In Chap.  14 some attention has been drawn to this issue. An impor-
tant element of the solution is repressing as much as possible the political rationality 
in the policy process by allowing a preferential treatment of the public goal by rec-
onciling the four rationalities: the political, legal, economic and scienti fi c rationali-
ties. The scienti fi c rationality mostly refers to the goal variable (public goal). It is 
obvious that in a risk society, the goal variable should be to protect against the major 
risks like climate warming,  fi nancial crisis etc. as they are perceived from citizens. 
The other variables are just boundary conditions (Snellen  2002 ) . An important ques-
tion is how to reconcile these rationalities? This is what we have learned from Simon 
who argued that it would be more adequate to say that a policy has to satisfy a set of 
requirements rather than to satisfy just one goal. Goals, motives and boundary con-
ditions are crucial concepts in this context. From this perspective, the means to 
protect against the major risks are the boundary conditions which set in motion a 
process of generation of alternatives (Simon  1964 ) . Involving professions to make 
sure that professional and not merely political norms prevail in the practice of ex 
ante evaluation of legislation would be desirable. A professional of ex ante evalua-
tion requires a balanced mix of three professions: economic, legal and social science 
methodological expertise (Hoppe  2009 ) . The advice is to integrate this way of think-
ing about law making in the curriculum of both public policy and law schools. 
 17.5  Policy Relevance, Limits and Directions 
for Further Research 
 The very nature of this book, which consists of a collection of explanatory case 
studies, should facilitate the understanding of different applications of global risk 
concepts in regulatory decision-making at practitioner’s level. All contributors are 
sympathetic to the dif fi culties faced by business actors in forecasting emerging 
global risks as part of investment appraisal processes. Correspondingly, it is 
acknowledged throughout the book that policy-makers and non-economic actors are 
confronted with similar challenges at the time of assessing, quantifying and mon-
etising the impacts of reductions in, for example, environmental and health risks for 
new projects and regulatory proposals. 
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 As mentioned above, these authors believe that one solution for an effective 
 integration of the global risk dimension rests in the systematic and meaningful 
deployment of regulatory reform tools in risk decision-making. This is not to say 
that such tools, in the shape of standard cost model, regulatory impact assessment 
and cost–bene fi t analysis are a panacea solution to all risk problems. Quite the 
opposite, from different perspectives, it has been pointed out that the current appli-
cation of these tools not only treats global risks in a far too rigid manner but also 
operates in a world of “bounded rationality”. In order to overcome the problematic 
relationship between risk and regulatory reform instruments, the following recom-
mendations are put forward:
 1.  Incorporating bene fi ts in forthcoming versions of the standard cost model. 
 2.  Integrating risk economics modelling in regulatory impact assessments, (e.g. meth-
ods to estimate the value of the environmental capital and the price of greenhouse 
gas emissions, modelling of the global risks of contagion and complexity, risk vs. 
risk trade-offs, risks related uncertainties in internalizing externalities, etc.). 
 3.  Increasing research on and application of techniques to monetize reductions in 
risks, particularly for  fi nancial, environmental and health risks in European risk 
regulatory decision-making. 
 4.  Incorporating behavioural science insights into regulatory analysis in order to 
not only reduce the economic and political cost of regulation but also increase its 
effectiveness. Lower regulatory costs and greater effectiveness may enable poli-
cymakers to achieve a more ambitious goal while saving resources for pursuing 
other legitimate social objectives. 
 Throughout the book it has been acknowledged that the existing literature in the 
area of global risks and the world risk society is extremely vast, yet fragmented. In 
particular, it was observed that the theoretical literature is large arguably due to the 
abundance of both empirical experiences and disciplines related to risk. The per-
spectives from economics, law, sociology, political science and public administra-
tion dominate this book as these are frequently used as lenses for the examination of 
world risk phenomena. 
 The common driver is the empirical nature of all the stories collected in this vol-
ume. This means that this work does not mechanically fall within any of these dis-
ciplinary strands or related sub-disciplinary braches, e.g. risk economics and risk 
governance. Issues of generalizability were addressed in the previous sections. It is 
worth adding that generalizability is affected by the time dimension (i.e. the period 
our contributions refer to) and space (i.e. the geographies our contributions are 
based on). With regard to time, a conscious effort has been made to deal with topics 
that are of current relevance to regulators and policymakers, hence the focus on the 
 fi nancial regulation, climate change, food, drugs,  fi scal policies and regulatory 
costs. As to space, the reader will have observed that there is a prevalence of contri-
butions focusing on developed economies and speci fi cally European ones. On the 
one hand, such focus limits the illustration of global risks and delineates rather nar-
row borders for the world risk society. On the other hand, recent developments, with 
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discussions on regulatory intervention and complexity in  fi nancial markets, levels 
of incentives for renewable sources of energy, measures for keeping the costs of 
contagion to the minimum with respect to Greece and Italy, make Europe very rel-
evant for any debate on societal risk. The EU is indeed increasingly emerging as de 
facto global regulator of all kind of rules concerning the environment, human health 
and safety (Chap.  3 ). What is more, the high level of integration of European coun-
tries, compared with other macro regions, means that this remains an extremely 
interesting investigation space for regulating cross-boundary risks like climate 
change,  fi nancial markets and food trade (Löfstedt and Vogel  2001 ) . 
 In an attempt to offer a nuanced picture of global risks and the world risk society, 
this book identi fi es areas that might be of interest for further research. It has been 
emphasized that the study of economic assessment tools for regulatory decision-
making in relation to risk has been ongoing for over 20 years. The different disci-
plines covered in this volume and elsewhere provide a wealth of angles for analysing 
the relationship between risks, bene fi ts and costs of regulatory decisions. However, 
what is missing is a structured research approach for studying, examining and 
(eventually) evaluating global risk tools for regulatory decision-making. Without 
such structured approach the risk is that additional research might be lost in the 
wide seas of policy analysis, public administration and administrative law. Whilst a 
code for classifying risk research would probably not  fi nd many proselytes, spelling 
out whether the research focuses on input, throughput or output would certainly not 
harm the research (and practitioner) community. Input risk research would be based 
on analysing the content of risk tools compared with some type of benchmark (e.g. 
institutional guidelines or comparative analysis with another country or sector). 
Indicatively research methods in this area would include descriptive statistics, case 
studies and archival data. For instance, input research on risk–bene fi t analysis 
would look at the data employed, compare them with a checklist derived from 
guidelines and practice, etc. Throughput risk research would focus on processes and 
the role of global risk tools in decision-making. Typically this type of research 
would make use of methods for understanding causal relations, including inter-
views and questionnaires. Following the example of risk–bene fi t analysis, through-
put research would seek to understand what role this tool has within the company 
called to implement it, in the sector where the company operates, and in the rela-
tionship between different stakeholders. Output risk research would  fi nally consist 
of analysis of the impacts the risk decision had on several levels (e.g. the economy, 
the environment, social conditions). The methods in this area could span from 
econometrics to threshold analysis. The need for further research on how to regulate 
risks is also driven by the fact that world risk society has become more and more 
complex so that risks of contagion are paramount. It is illustrated by the recent 
credit and debt crises, but also by accidents of contagion in complex food supply 
chains. Now that regulating risk, due to this enhanced complexity and transbound-
ary character, is an increasingly complicated business, policymakers and industry 
representatives have the imperative to take up this challenge and deliver better busi-
ness regulation in a risk society. 
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